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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
party intended to condone. This decision goes far in holding that the
offending party's bad faith, though apparently short of active fraud,
is conclusive proof that there is no condonation. The injured party
is not forced to rely on the condition subsequent for protection. The
court goes even further, suggesting that the offending party must
affirmatively intend a reconciliation before there is condonation.20
The court, however, did not consider the situation where there
is a mere neutrality of intent, as where intercourse was had just
as a satisfaction of desire. Thus, the language suggesting that the
offender must affirmatively intend to be reconciled leaves open the
question whether a mere neutrality of intent would result in a finding
of no condonation as a matter of law.
The principal case is in line with the trend holding that a single
act of intercourse is not conclusive on the issue of condonation, but
merely an evidentiary factor. It goes further than any of the other
cases in indicating that the offending party's intent may often be
determinative. If the language of the court were taken at face value,
condonation would be made to depend on the mutual intent and good
faith of the parties. This seems a salutary result. The policy behind
condonation is the maintenance of the home, and this would appear
desirable only when both parties are in good faith in wanting to con-
tinue the marriage.
EVIDENCE-PARTY NOT BOUND BY TESTIMONY OF OWN WITNESS
Johnson iv. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 208 F.2d 633 (3d Cir. 1953)
A railroad detective shot and killed a man whose administratrix
sued the railroad under a wrongful death statute. Plaintiff called to
the stand the detective who was the sole witness to the shooting.'
His uncontradicted testimony was that decedent attacked him with
a knife when the detective attempted to arrest decedent for the com-
mission of a felony. Corroborating testimony established that the
detective showed the effects of knife wounds. A verdict and judgment
for the plaintiff was affirmed by the appellate court which held that
plaintiff was not bound by the uncontradicted testimony of the detec-
20. Daniels v. Daniels, 99 A.2d 717, 719 (Sup. Ct. Del. 1953). This seems to be
the idea accepted in New Jersey. See Rushmore v. Rushmore, 12 N.J. Misc. 575,
588, 174 At. 469, 476 (Cl. 1934); Totten v. Totten, 60 At. 1095, 1096 (N.J. Ch.
1905).
1. The court pointed out that plaintiff did not try to invoke FED. R. Civ. P. 43(b) which provides:
A party may call an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent
of a public or private corporation ... and interrogate him by leading ques-
tions and contradict and impeach him in all respects as if he had been called
by the adverse party....
Since the detective was not an "adverse party or an officer, director, or managing
agent" of the railroad corporation, it appears that plaintiff was not entitled to the
benefits of this rule. See Dowell, Inc. v. Jowers, 182 F.2d 576 (5th Cir. 1950).
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tive whom she called as her witness. The court stated that the evi-
dence presented a question for the jury.2
The general rule is that a party is bound by the testimony of his
own witness.- The rule is not without exceptions: the party calling
the witness can show that his testimony is self-contradictory or in-
herently improbable, 4 or can show by additional witnesses5 or other
competent evidences that it is false or mistaken. The principal case
is not in accord with the general rule; the court held that plaintiff
was not bound by the detective's testimony although it was not in-
herently improbable, nor was it contradicted by other evidence.
The court quotes text writers who say that a party need not vouch
for everything his own witness says.7 These writers, however, make
this statement as an incident to their position, which is contrary to
the general rule, that a party may impeach his own witness ;8 but
impeachment was not involved in the principal case since plaintiff
made no attempt to impeach or discredit the detective. The court
apparently commingled two distinct legal rules: (1) one is bound
by the testimony of his own witness; (2) one may not impeach his
own witness. Within the first rule, a party producing a witness
may prove material facts by other competent evidence although the
effect of that proof is to contradict directly his prior witness.9 Proof
of these facts should be allowed whatever may be the incidental effect
upon the credibility of any witness.", The object of impeachment,
on the other hand, is to discredit the witness directly by evidence
collateral to the material issues of the case. The position taken by
the writers that a party may impeach his own witness may be sound.
Impeachment, however, was not involved in the principal case and
2. Johnson v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 208 F.2d 633 (3d Cir. 1953).
3. Wright v. Gordon's Transport, Inc., 162 F.2d 59D (5th Cir. 1947); Wiget v.
Becker, 84 F.2d 706 (8th Cir. 1936). See State v. Castino, 264 S.W.2d 372 (Mo.
1954). In Texas Prudential Ins. Co. v. Turner, 127 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. Civ. App.
1939), the court said that plaintiff must allege and prove that the death of her
husband was caused accidentally. She offered as her witness the person who shot
her husband, and was bound by this testimony because the testimony was not con-
tradicted, nor was the witness impeached.
4. Greenfield v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 165 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1947). Cf.
United States v. Barber Lumber Co., 172 Fed. 948, 962 (C.C.D. Idaho 1909).
5. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Crouse, 286 Fed. 376 (6th Cir. 1923). See Michigan
Cent. R.R. v. Zimmerman, 24 F.2d 23, 25 (6th Cir. 1928).
6. Zumwalt v. Gardner, 160 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1947). See Wirfs v. D. W.
Bosley Co., 20 F.2d 632, 633 (8th Cir. 1927); Coonrod v. Kelly, 119 Fed. 841, 846
(3d Cir. 1902).
7. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCFE-COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAw 43 (1947); TRAcY,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 193 (1952); 3 WIGMORE, EVmENCE § 899(3d ed. 1940). Ladd, Impeachment of One's Own Witnesses-New Developments,
4 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 69, 96 (1936). See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENcE, Rule 106(1952)1.
8.Ii.
9. Burris v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 226 S.W.2d 743 (Mo. 1950).
10. JONES, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF EVIDENcE 4814 (2d ed. Henderson
1926).
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since the case was not within one of the exceptions to the rule that
one is bound by the testimony of his own witness, it is submitted that
the court's decision was unsound.
Where uncontradicted, non-conflicting testimony is given by un-
impeached witnesses so that disinterested and reasonable men could
reach but one conclusion, there is no question for the jury, and a case
is established for a directed verdict." In the principal case there
was no evidence by which the plaintiff could sustain her burden of
proof. The fact that the sole witness to the encounter was an em-
ployee of the defendant did not discharge plaintiff's burden.12 For
these reasons the court should have reversed the trial court's denial
of defendant's motion for a directed verdict. There was no need to
consider the question whether a party is bound by his own witness,
which question was unnecessary and immaterial to the decision in the
case.
REAL PROPBERTY-LATERAL SUPPORT-RIGHT OF EXCAVATING CON-
TRACTOR TO RECOVER COST OF UNDERPINNING ADTACENT BUILDINGS
Warfel v. Vondersmitk, 376 Pa. 1, 101 A.2d 736 (1954)
Plaintiff, a general contractor employed to excavate a city lot, noti-
fied defendant, who owned the adjacent lot, that he should take mea-
sures to prevent the collapse of his buildings abutting the property
line. Defendant took inadequate measures. To prevent injury to work-
men and others and to prevent interference with his work, plaintiff
entered defendant's land with defendant's permission and under-
pinned the buildings. When plaintiff's building job was completed, he
brought an action to recover the cost of the underpinning. The jury
returned a verdict for plaintiff. Defendant's motion for new trial was
granted. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed and
held that because the defendant was under no duty to provide tem-
porary support for his own buildings, the excavator would have to
bear the expense of any support which the excavator supplied.'
A landowner's right to lateral support of his land is well defined. If
his land is unimproved, he can recover the damages resulting from a
11. Burdon v. Wood, 142 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1944); United States v. Barber
Lumber Co., 172 Fed. 948 (C.C.D. Idaho 1909).
12. Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 184 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1950).
1. Warfel v. Vondersmith, 376 Pa. 1, 101 A.2d 736 (1954). It was impossible
for the lower court to render a judgment non obstante veredicto in this case
because of a counterclaim filed by defendant which was considered by the jury in
assessing damages for plaintiff.
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